Opportunity to participate in the IPO of the KKR Credit Income Trust (ASX:KKC)
Powerwrap clients have been offered the opportunity to participate in the KKR Credit Income Trust IPO and Powerwrap will be acting as a co-manager of this capital raising.
As a valued client of Powerwrap, we would like to invite you to participate in this IPO offering by placing bids through the Powerwrap platform.
Advisers that are eligible for the offer will receive 1.25% selling fee (incl. GST) for their allocation on this transaction.
By way of background, KKR is a leading global investment firm with 42 years of experience and a strong track record of investment excellence. KKR has US$200B+ in AUM globally, and is a leader in Credit investing, with 120 dedicated credit investment professionals managing ~US$70B in AUM.
KKC seeks to provide a differentiated return profile as compared to Australian income securities through exposure to income generating global credit. The strategy seeks to produce a high return relative to volatility, targeting a net return of 6-8% p.a. with a target net cash yield of 4-6% p.a. through the market cycle.
The Trust seeks to provide
this exposure by investing in to two underlying KKR credit
Global Credit Opportunities Fund (GCOF): long-term target
portfolio allocation of 50-60%; and
European Direct Lending (EDL): long-term target allocation of
40-50% investment strategy.
Below is a copy of the DRAFT PROSPECTUS which is due to be lodged on Monday 16th September and have also outlined Terms of the proposed transaction with the associated timeline.
If you wish to run through the capital raising in more detail, please feel free to call me or our Investments Manager – Ishan Dan on +61 3 8681 4658 . Otherwise please complete the below form to lodge your interest / bid and we will contact you as soon as possible.
Realm Investment House | Ken Liow, Head of Portfolio Risk Management Realm Investment House
The term premium is the difference between bond yields for a given maturity and the expected path of short term interest rates over the same period. By examining the term premium of the US treasury market, we find that this is now of a similar magnitude as for the OPEC oil shocks in the 1970s. The market appears to be fully pricing an event of similar magnitude to the combined effect of a US-China Trade War and a domestic demand shock in China. Investors relying on the term premium for portfolio protection may wish to consider the implied cost of doing so.
Bond yields can be divided in to two components: the expected cash rate over the term to maturity; and the term premium. The term premium can be considered as a price for bearing risk and variations in this figure provide an insight into the concerns which investors are pricing. When the term premium for bonds is negative, it implies that investors are essentially expecting to pay for protection against poor outcomes. They would rather hold a bond even if the expected yield to maturity of this bond is lower than the expected path of rates they would obtain over the same period. If economic outcomes deteriorate unexpectedly, this would provide a buffer. The Federal Reserve of New York provides daily estimates of the term premium for US Treasuries1. The series is calculated from 1961. The term premia for the 1, 2 and 3 year maturities are shown in the following chart. The term premia have never been lower in the history of the series. The most recent plunge coincided with a deterioration in the outlook for trade negotiations:
Historical Comparison Whilst the term premium is only one indicator of risk aversion, the only times we have observed figures in the vicinity of these outcomes were as follows:
For context, the economic impacts following the Oil Shocks and the GFC were very significant:
The ‘Kennedy Slide’ was a period during which the S&P 500 declined by over 20%. It followed an extended period of share market gains commencing from the Crash of 1929. The sharp movement in the term premium in this period was short-lived. In relation to Brexit, the shock of the event could be readily seen in the expected inflation forecasts that accompanied the outcome. The FOMC’s preferred measure of the 5-year, 5-year forward inflation expectations at the time, of 1.4% per annum, have only been seen during events like the worst of the GFC and during the Asian Financial Crisis. At present, the expectation matches the Fed’s inflation target, implying high confidence in the Fed’s ability to successfully navigate economic circumstances. In contrast, the US economy is currently growing ahead of trend, although inflationary outcomes have been below the mandate target of 2% per annum. Unemployment is exceptionally low. Whilst concerns have been raised about the weakening outlook for manufacturing, the uncertain outlook for trade negotiations and the persistent risk that the Chinese economy will stumble, the pricing infers that the market is fully discounting an exceptionally poor economic outcome. It should be noted that the term premium is estimated using econometric methods and these are subject to a range of estimation and specification errors. However, cross-checking these with another principal term premium estimator utilised by the Fed2, albeit with publication history from 1990, also results in a similar conclusion. For this cross-check, the term premium is still lower than for Brexit. It was similar to the period where the Euro bond markets were fragmenting in 2012, leading Draghi to make his “whatever it takes” statement to address the deterioration in the transmission of monetary stimulus which threatened the longevity of the Euro.
Fully Pricing a Trade War, China Demand Shock…and then some The market price for insurance, as estimated from the term premium, is fully pricing a scenario similar to the combined effect of a full scale US-China trade war and a significant deterioration (2%) in domestic demand within China. The OECD has recently3 estimated the cumulative impact on GDP from each of these events through to 2021-22. Whilst significant, the combined impact of these outcomes is unlikely to create a deep recession in the US. The US is a reasonably closed, services oriented, economy in that it is relatively resilient to international economic developments. This is one reason behind President Trump’s repeated utilisation of trade as a means of coercion in international negotiations. The following illustrates the OECD’s estimated impact for a deterioration in the trade conflict:
The OECD also estimated the impact of a significant 2% fall in domestic demand in China:
Over a two year period, a significant deterioration in the trade dispute would subtract approximately 0.9% to US growth. A significant disruption to demand in China, in isolation, would cumulatively subtract approximately 1.4% from US growth over a 2 year period. Note that the China demand slow-down scenario assumes that monetary policy is unable to act. The estimated economic impacts do not make allowance for any special fiscal support which might be forthcoming. For example, the US is supporting soy bean farmers for losses incurred as a result of the tariff dispute via subsidies. Hence, to the extent that the US would stimulate the economy fiscally during an adverse development, the scenarios would need to be even worse to justify the existing pricing. The US GDP baseline expectation is for growth in 2020-2021 to be 1.9%per annum. Even if the combined effect of a full US-China Trade War and demand shock in China were to take place, there is a significant buffer between this scenario and the outcomes which unfolded or, in the case of Brexit and the Kennedy Slide, were feared, during the only other times when the term premium was this low.
Distortions from international flows and Fed balance sheet activities Non-conventional use of central bank balance sheets to manage the yield curve as part of stimulus efforts operate by influencing the term premium. Although the Fed has unwound some of its balance sheet, its remaining holdings would still be exerting downward pressure on the term premium, however this is most strongly influential on longer term maturities. The prospect of the ECB restarting bond purchases in the Eurozone may also be driving capital from European debt in to the US and contributing to the more recent compression in the term premium. More generally, significant monetary accommodation and associated asset inflation may have had the effect of compressing term premium since sentiment strongly deteriorated from late 2018. The above may go some way to understanding the lower premium observed following the introduction of large scale asset purchases. Nonetheless, the estimated impact of the Fed’s balance sheet activities4 would not be sufficient to negate the general observation that the term premium is pricing an extreme economic development. Even allowing for these effects, the market is acting materially more defensively than when the Euro faced an existential threat and the Brexit referendum was passed, both of which took place when the US economy was not as strong as it is presently.
Conclusion There are many looming threats to the recent recovery in the US economy. The term premium for treasury bonds, which can provide an indication of the extent to which the market is concerned for downside risk, is at an extreme. Should the worst-case scenarios not develop, we may expect a significant steepening of the US yield curve. Investors relying on duration to provide a measure of protection to portfolios may wish to consider the implied price for this insurance.
Below are the Realm Investment Management fund figures as at the end of August.
Confidentiality Notice: This document is confidential and may also be legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient you may not copy, forward, distribute, disclose or use any part of it. If you have received this document in error, please delete it and all copies from your system and notify the sender as soon as possible. General Advice Warning: Realm Pty Ltd AFSL 421336 Please note that any advice given by Realm Pty Ltd and its authorised representatives is deemed to be GENERAL advice, as the information or advice given does not take into account your particular objectives, financial situation or needs. Therefore at all times you should consider the appropriateness of the advice before you act further. Further, our AFSL only authorises us to give general advice to WHOLESALE investors only.
Each month we give our readers a little insight into a Powerwrap team member by asking them ten questions about their role, life and personality. This issue we speak to Tannille Miller from the Powerwrap Marketing team.
Name: Tannille Miller
Company role: Marketing Coordinator
What does your role at Powerwrap entail? I focus on increasing our brand awareness through platforms like our website, social media and digital advertising.
What nickname do you prefer to be called? Tannille is fine, no nicknames work for Tannille.
What you enjoy most about being Marketing Coordinator? I like the creativity involved with coming up with new ideas to appeal to our audience.
What do you like most about Powerwrap? The people are lovely, and it’s exciting to be part of such a unique company.
What were you like in high school? A good student, when I wasn’t getting distracted by my friends.
What’s your favorite 80-90s jam? Wannabe – Spice Girls
Authors – Erik Weisman, Ph.D. Chief Economist Fixed Income Portfolio Manager | Robert M. Almeida Portfolio Manager and Global Investment Strategist | MFS Investment Management
Globalization created a multi-decade tailwind for margins.
But there are growing signs that globalization has reached its limits.
As a result, margins may be at risk.
Changing business environments have a way of exposing corporate vulnerabilities, amplifying the importance of selectivity.
An accelerated brand of globalization, labeled by some as hyper-globalization, has been underway for the better part of a generation. Spurred in part by NAFTA, the inception of the euro and China’s acceptance into the World Trade Organization, multinational companies have ridden the globalization wave along with its secular tailwind to margins. But with growing concern that globalization may have reached its limits, are margins at risk?
In the post–global financial crisis era, chief financial officers have become extremely adept at employing all manner of financial engineering in order to increase margins, earnings and stock prices. They’ve adopted capital-light strategies, increased leverage, engaged in debt financed mergers and acquisitions and bought back stock. Companies have also become proficient in driving down costs by managing global value chains, sourcing intermediate goods and services from around the world and assembling them in low-cost countries.
At the same time, they’ve engaged in international regulatory and tax arbitrage. But as we’ve globalized more and more, the marginal benefits of additional globalization have decreased. The value added resulting from NAFTA, the formation of the eurozone and offshoring appears to be at an end.
As good as it gets?
While globalization has ebbed and flowed for thousands of years, the post–Bretton Woods order that gave rise to today’s global value chain has been underpinned by the central role of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency, institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and the United States acting as the world’s enforcer.
Against that backdrop, the global value chain has been predicated on a relentless decline in tariffs. But there are growing signs that globalization may have reached it limits, with rising income inequality and a concurrent increase in populism among the symptoms. The US–China trade war calls into question the viability of the global value chain in a world where tariff rates may be reversing their decades-long fall. If the US were to apply 25% tariffs on all imported goods from China, overall tariff levels would rise toward heights not seen since the 1960s.
However, global value chains weren’t designed for 1960s-style tariffs. At those heights, value chains would likely fray. At the same time, non-tariff barriers are seemingly on the rise everywhere. The global value chain was built for a world of low tariffs in which free trade is seen as a public good. But recent events call that view into question, putting the multi–trillion dollar global value chain at risk.
No levers left to pull
In an environment where CFOs have already pulled all the available levers, is there any margin for error from an asset price perspective? We’d argue there isn’t much. If globalization is reversing and global value chains are undermined or forced to make expensive adjustments, gross margins are likely to be negatively impacted. Companies that generated above-average margins, profits and equity performance not because they produced superior products but because they effectively managed global supply chains may find themselves in unsustainable positions, no longer surrounded by an economic moat. And in an environment where management has few cards left to play and margins are at risk due to supply chain disruptions, companies with truly differentiated business models, unique intellectual property and strong brand equity are likely to be better positioned to deal with the shifting global conditions. Companies that are unable to quickly move production to avoid the impacts of tariffs and those without pricing power could be at risk.
This potential dislocation makes security selection increasingly important as market dispersion reasserts itself after a decade of monolithic index-driven price action. In essence, late in the business cycle investors have become much choosier, avoiding highly leveraged companies with falling gross margins as well as lower-quality cyclicals. As is often the case, changing business environments have a way of exposing corporate vulnerabilities, amplifying the importance of selectivity.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and are subject to change at any time. These views are for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a recommendation to purchase any security or as a solicitation or investment advice from the Advisor. Unless otherwise indicated, logos and product and service names are trademarks of MFS® and its affi liates and may be registered in certain countries. Distributed by: U.S. – MFS Investment Management; Latin America – MFS International Ltd.; Canada – MFS Investment Management Canada Limited. No securities commission or similar regulatory authority in Canada has reviewed this communication. Please note that in Europe and Asia Pacifi c, this document is intended for distribution to investment professionals and institutional clients only. U.K. – MFS International (U.K.) Limited (“MIL UK”), a private limited company registered in England and Wales with the company number 03062718, and authorized and regulated in the conduct of investment business by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority. MIL UK, One Carter Lane, London, EC4V 5ER UK provides products and investment services to institutional investors. This material shall not be circulated or distributed to any person other than to professional investors (as permitted by local regulations) and should not be relied upon or distributed to persons where such reliance or distribution would be contrary to local regulation; Singapore – MFS International Singapore Pte. Ltd. (CRN 201228809M); Australia/New Zealand – MFS International Australia Pty Ltd (“ MFS Australia”) holds an Australian fi nancial services licence number 485343. MFS Australia is regulated by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.; Hong Kong – MFS International (Hong Kong) Limited (“MIL HK”), a private limited company licensed and regulated by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (the “SFC”). MIL HK is approved to engage in dealing in securities and asset management regulated activities and may provide certain investment services to “professional investors” as defi ned in the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”). Japan – MFS Investment Management K.K., is registered as a Financial Instruments Business Operator, Kanto Local Finance Bureau (FIBO) No.312, a member of the Investment Trust Association, Japan and the Japan Investment Advisers Association. As fees to be borne by investors vary depending upon circumstances such as products, services, investment period and market conditions, the total amount nor the calculation methods cannot be disclosed in advance. All investments involve risks, including market fl uctuation and investors may lose the principal amount invested. Investors should obtain and read the prospectus and/or document set forth in Article 37-3 of Financial Instruments and Exchange Act carefully before making the investments.
George Deligiannis | Head of Distribution at Newmark Capital
We are delighted to announce Newmark Hardware Trust has been added to the platform to form part of our direct property income producing investment options.
The Hardware Trust offers investors the opportunity to invest in four A-grade, high-profile properties. Well located in strong fast-growing local economies with access to excellent transport options. The buildings are well leased to national blue-chip businesses including Bunnings, Officeworks, JB Hi Fi underpinning the stable and secure rental income returns.
Introducing the Newmark Hardware Trust
Open-ended unlisted property trust investing in real property
Established track record delivering 15% total return per annum since trust inception to February 20192
Over 85% of the Trust’s income is underpinned by Bunnings
Fixed annual rent reviews of 3.00 – 4.00%
Geographically diversified multi asset trust
Delivering strong, consistent long-term income distributions
Tax advantaged income component
No entry and exit fees
Capital growth potential
Disciplined defensive investment strategy designed to reduce both market and specific risk
The Product Disclosure Statement dated 12 February 2019 describes the fees, costs and risks.
This Trust is suited to
Investors seeking consistent income
Investors seeking tax effective income
SMSFs – Ideal for investors managing their own retirement
Investors wanting access to a diversified portfolio of unlisted Australian property
Newmark has a 5 year track record of successfully managing the portfolio
Strong history of tenant retention
15.0% per annum total return since inception2
Ongoing asset management activity to ensure future competitiveness
1. Warragul is under development with an indicative value of $50.9M on completion mid 2020.
2. Performance is based on original fully paid Units at $1.00. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Fund inception 2014.
About Newmark Capital
Newmark Capital Limited is an experienced
property funds management business that manages approximately $975 million of
real estate assets under management on behalf of wholesale and retail
investors. Newmark Capital is an active property investment manager with a
concentrated focus on income and has been investing on behalf of its clients in
commercial real estate since 2011.
For further information call George Deligiannis, Head of Distribution at Newmark Capital on 03 9820 3344.
Newmark Capital Limited ACN 126 529 690
AFSL No. 319372 (“Newmark Capital”) is the responsible entity of the Newmark
Hardware Trust ARSN 161 274 111 (“Trust”) Newmark Capital has not considered
the investment objectives, financial circumstances or particular needs of any
particular recipient. You should consider your own financial situation,
objectives and needs and obtain professional advice. Past performance is not
indicative of future performance. You should read the Product Disclosure
Statement dated 15 February 2019 (as updated or replaced) before making an
investment decision relating to the Trust. Forward-looking statements involve
risks, uncertainties and assumptions which are beyond the control of Newmark
Capital and are not guarantees of future performance.
Michael Price is Portfolio Manager of the Ausbil Active Dividend Fund at Ausbil Investment Management.
Regular equity income can help beat longevity risk and inflation, but finding quality income in equities is not as simple as it seems. Ausbil’s Michael Price talks us through successful active dividend investing.
Investors in the later stages of their accumulation phase, approaching retirement, and in retirement can benefit from the use of equities as part of their overall income plan. With a rolling 10 year dividend yield of 4.18%, equities can provide a vastly more attractive income than alternatives. Investors face two major risks that impact how much they have to fund retirement, and how long this will last: longevity risk, and the risk of inflation/rising costs over time. In simple terms, longevity risk is the risk of outliving your money. Inflation risk is the risk that rising costs (such as healthcare) reduces the purchasing power of your money each year. An equities approach to income can help outpace those rising costs, and provide long-term capital appreciation to help replenish funds.
does active dividend income investing work?
An active dividend investment approach can
add value to a portfolio, and generate outperformance, through focusing on quality
companies with strong dividends and dividend growth, companies with sustainable
earnings growth, maximising the benefits available through the tax and
imputation system, and tactical allocation to capture a greater share of dividend
Markets are efficient, but not perfect. The
first and most fundamental reason that an active approach to income investing works
is the fact that the market is relatively inefficient, particularly in the
short term. However, some inefficiencies can be traps.
risk of chasing yield for yield’s sake
The assumption that many income investors make regarding dividend yields is that the relationship of current dividend yield to future earnings growth is linear, that is, the higher the dividend yield, the higher the future earnings growth from which dividends are paid. This assumption does not actually hold in the market.
On average, the top dividend yield companies actually see low, or even negative, earnings growth going forward compared to companies in the 4th to 7th decile of companies, as illustrated in Figure 1. This has been true for the last 20 years. An active approach does more than simply chase the highest yield, as would a passive approach to yield. An active dividend income strategy can increase income from companies whose dividends are healthy, but maybe not the highest, because they are also investing earnings into a growing business, hence into better earnings growth in the year ahead. Another quirk of dividend investing is that the highest yielding stocks are more volatile, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Top decile dividend yielding companies tend to show higher volatility in returns, on average. An active approach to dividend income investing can seek to reduce portfolio return volatility by not chasing yield for yield’s sake, but investing judiciously on the fundamental value of future sustainable earnings growth. Finally, top dividend paying securities may not be good value-for-risk, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Chasing the highest dividend yield companies can provide poor value for risk taken when compared to the market. Lower decile stocks by dividend yield demonstrate a better performance for risk than for the top decile of dividend yield companies. High dividend payout ratios may also be indicative of a lack of equity reinvestment opportunities for a company, back into growing their own business. A company with a sustainable dividend profile usually seeks to reinvest some earnings into their business, into positive return projects that can generate earnings growth in the future. A classic example of a high dividend paying company compared to a company which has reinvested some earnings into productive opportunities for reinvestment is the difference between Telstra and CSL.
Purely to illustrate two different
journeys, take a look at the following example. Telstra was long considered a
key dividend paying stock, but the burden of being the largest telco, legacy
systems and infrastructure cost, rapid change and limits to growth have seen
Telstra lose its status as a key dividend stock. By contrast, CSL has steadily
transformed itself from also being government owned, as the Commonwealth Serum
Laboratories, into a global leader in biotechnology, largely by balancing the payment
of dividends with significant reinvestment into areas that can generate future
growth in earnings, as illustrated in figure 4. Of course, these relationships
may change over time, but it can take a long time for a company to change its
Astute active dividend income approaches can seek dividend yield while avoiding companies with no opportunity to reinvest to improve earnings and returns. With active dividend income approaches, investors like SMSFs, retirees, and investors approaching retirement can diversify away from traditional sources of income, like fixed income and term deposits, for a longer-term approach, diversified across high-quality Australian companies. They can do this in equities without sacrificing the potential for long-term growth.
About Ausbil Investment Management Ausbil is a leading Australian based investment manager. Established in April 1997, Ausbil’s core business is the management of Australian equities for major superannuation funds, institutional investors, master trust and retail clients. Ausbil is owned by its employees and New York Life Investment Management a wholly-owned subsidiary of New York Life Insurance Company. As at 31 July 2019, Ausbil manage over $12.2 billion in funds under management.
otherwise specified, any information contained in this publication is current
as at the date of this report and is prepared by Ausbil Investment Management
Limited (ABN 26 076 316 473 AFSL 229722) (Ausbil). Ausbil is the issuer of the
Ausbil Active Dividend Income Fund (ARSN 621 670 120) (Fund). This report
contains general information only and the information provided is factual only and
does not constitute financial product advice. It does not take account of your
individual objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on it, you
should seek independent financial and tax advice about its appropriateness to
your objectives, financial situation and needs. Securities and sectors
mentioned in this monthly report are presented to illustrate companies and
sectors in which the Fund has invested and should not be considered a
recommendation to purchase, sell or hold any particular security. Holdings are
subject to change daily. The value of an investment and the income from it can
fall as well as rise and you may not get back the amount originally invested.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Unless otherwise
stated, performance figures are calculated net of fees and assume distributions
are reinvested. Due to rounding the figures in the holdings, breakdowns may not
add up to 100%. No guarantee or warranty is made as to the accuracy, adequacy
or reliability of any statements, estimates, opinions or other information
contained herein (any of which may change without notice) and should not be
relied upon as a representation express or implied as to any future or current
matter. You should consider the Product Disclosure Statement which is available
at http://www.ausbil.com.au before acquiring or investing in the fund.